Bug 2576781 (CVE-2026-99536)

Summary: CVE-2026-99536 kernel: kernel: ksmbd: unauthorized access via compound request session binding
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's ksmbd (in-kernel SMB server). When handling compound Server Message Block (SMB) requests, a failed multichannel session binding operation retains its target session context on the work item. A remote attacker can exploit this flaw by sending a crafted compound request, causing subsequent commands in the request chain to reuse the retained session and tree connection. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to bypass session restrictions and gain unauthorized access to file shares.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 15:31:57 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: prevent session binding in compound requests

A failed multichannel binding can retain its target session on the work
item so that the error response can be signed. Subsequent compound
commands can then use that session together with a tree connection left
over from an earlier command.

Limit binding SESSION_SETUP requests to standalone messages during
message validation, before smb2_sess_setup() can replace work->sess.
Check both NextCommand and the current request offset to cover binding
in the first, middle and last positions of a compound. The existing
validation error path returns STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER and stops
processing the remaining commands.

This intentionally limits support for compounded binding. It is not a
protocol requirement that binding be standalone. Standalone binding and
non-binding compounds retain their existing behavior, without changing
session, tree or response encryption handling.