Bug 2576805 (CVE-2026-99544)

Summary: CVE-2026-99544 kernel: kernel: out-of-bounds write in Hyper-V VMBus via unchecked shared ring buffer indices
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Hyper-V Virtual Machine Bus (VMBus) driver. In confidential virtual machine environments where the host hypervisor is untrusted, the guest kernel fails to validate read and write indices stored in shared memory. A malicious host can manipulate these indices to cause the guest kernel to perform out-of-bounds memory writes. This vulnerability can lead to guest memory corruption, a denial of service (DoS), or guest compromise.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 15:33:28 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices

In a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and
write indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as
potentially malicious.

hv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds
checking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset
up to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too:
the available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how
much is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than
the ring.

The fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated
snapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices,
hv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO.

One re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch:
hv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices
trailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an
offset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is
addressed later in the series.

Open-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of
prerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function.