Bug 2576885 (CVE-2026-99551)

Summary: CVE-2026-99551 kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via race condition during OCFS2 cluster removal
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. A race condition exists in the OCFS2 (Oracle Cluster File System 2) cluster management module when cluster resources are removed while an active quorum decision is being processed. A local user can trigger this flaw during cluster teardown, causing the kernel to dereference a null pointer and resulting in a system crash and Denial of Service (DoS).
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Clone Of: Environment:
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 15:38:19 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: drain quorum work before removing the cluster

The configured cluster must remain available until an in-flight quorum
decision has finished using its fencing method.  o2quo_make_decision()
drops qs_lock before calling o2quo_fence_self(), which marks heartbeat
regions for unclean stop and then reads
o2nm_single_cluster->cl_fence_method.  Cluster removal clears the
singleton without waiting for this independent system-workqueue item.

When a failed-quorum decision overlaps removal of the heartbeat regions,
nodes and cluster through configfs, the worker can be preempted after
marking the regions and resume after the singleton has been cleared:

  Quorum worker                     Configfs removal
  select fence; drop qs_lock
  o2hb_stop_all_regions()
                                    remove regions; join heartbeat threads
                                    remove nodes; stop o2net
                                    clear singleton; release cluster
  read cl_fence_method

The resumed read dereferences NULL instead of applying the configured
fencing method. The heartbeat thread's dependency protects the local
node only until the thread exits, and draining o2net does not wait for
qs_work.

Add o2quo_flush_work() to drain pending or running quorum decisions
before clearing the singleton in o2nm_cluster_group_drop_item(). By
this point the heartbeat regions and nodes have been removed, so their
work publishers are stopped. The worker can finish while the cluster
and its configured fencing method remain available. It does not acquire
the configfs mutex held by the removal path.

Keep o2quo_exit() as the counterpart of o2quo_init() for module teardown
and initialization failure, and have it call the same drain helper.
Cluster removal uses only the explicitly named drain operation.

KASAN report as below:

    Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000011b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
    KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000008d8-0x00000000000008df]
    CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
    Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
    Workqueue: events o2quo_make_decision
    RIP: 0010:o2quo_fence_self+0x65/0x200

Register dump omitted.

    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     o2quo_make_decision+0x345/0x3a0
     ? __pfx_o2quo_make_decision+0x10/0x10
     ? process_one_work+0x834/0x1b40
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     process_one_work+0x9a8/0x1b40
     ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
     ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300
     ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __kthread_parkme+0x177/0x220
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
     kthread+0x351/0x460
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
     ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
     ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __switch_to+0x74f/0xf70
     ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
     ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
     </TASK>
    Modules linked in:
    ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---