Bug 2576886 (CVE-2026-99429)

Summary: CVE-2026-99429 kernel: kernel: Denial of service via use-after-free race condition in ocfs2
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's OCFS2 (Oracle Cluster File System 2) subsystem. A local user can exploit this vulnerability to cause a system crash, resulting in a denial of service (DoS), or potentially corrupt kernel memory. The issue occurs due to a race condition during reference-count tree lookups, where a lock is released before securing an object reference, leading to a use-after-free condition during concurrent file operations.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
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Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 15:38:23 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: pin refcount trees before dropping the lookup lock

A refcount tree returned to ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree() must stay alive
until that caller releases its operation reference. However,
ocfs2_get_refcount_tree() returns the cached pointer after dropping
osb_lock, and the caller only takes its kref afterwards. The registry
reference does not protect this gap from concurrent removal.

This can happen when another node frees a refcount root and reuses its
block with a different generation while this mount retains the old
cached tree. Two local operations on different inodes sharing the new
root, such as data CoW and an external xattr update, can then look up
the same stale tree. Their inode locks are independent, and both the
REFCOUNT DLM lock and rf_sem are acquired after the first operation
reference.

The following ordering is possible, with no other operation references:

  Data CoW                         Xattr update
  --------                         ------------
  Look up the old tree under
    osb_lock, then drop osb_lock
                                   Look up the same tree and take a kref
                                   Acquire the tree locks and read the
                                     new on-disk generation
                                   Erase the old tree under osb_lock
                                   Unlock and drop the operation kref
                                   Drop the registry kref, freeing tree
  Take a kref through the
    freed tree pointer

The final kref_get() accesses freed rf_getcnt storage, and subsequent
accesses in ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree() also use the freed allocation.

Take the operation reference in ocfs2_get_refcount_tree() before
releasing osb_lock, including when an insertion loses to another lookup.
Removal must acquire the same lock, so it cannot drop the registry
reference before the lookup has pinned the tree. Keep the existing
unlock and error path puts. The two callers that already hold the
refcount tree lock keep their borrowed lookup behavior and do not
acquire an extra reference.

KASAN report as below:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
    Read of size 4 at addr ffff888117212820 by task python3/497

[Kernel and hardware identification omitted.]

    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
     print_report+0xce/0x630
     ? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
     ? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
     kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
     ? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
     ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
     ? __pfx_ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x3b6/0xd90
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610
     ? ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x3b6/0xd90
     ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x410/0xd90
     ? __pfx_ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x10/0x10
     ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
     ? down_write+0x11a/0x1f0
     ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
     ? ocfs2_inode_unlock+0x1a9/0x260
     ? __pfx_ocfs2_inode_unlock+0x10/0x10
     ? ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x1413/0x1d30
     ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x157b/0x1d30
     ? __pfx_ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x10/0x10
     ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300
     ? __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1b7/0x220
     ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? security_file_permission+0x26/0x80
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100
     vfs_write+0x639/0x1010
     ? __pfx_ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x10/0x10
     ? lock_vma_under_rcu+0x154/0x4a0
     ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
     ? lock_release+0x121/0x290
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1b7/0x220
     ? __pfx___x64_sys_pwrite64+0x10/0x10
     ? irqentry_exit+0xbe/0x820
---truncated---