Bug 2576916 (CVE-2026-99531)

Summary: CVE-2026-99531 kernel: kernel: ksmbd: privilege escalation via session ID mismatch in encrypted SMB requests
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's ksmbd Server Message Block (SMB) server. When processing encrypted requests on a connection with multiple sessions, the server selects the decryption key using the session identifier in the transform header but executes the request under the session identifier named in the decrypted inner header without verifying that both match. An authenticated remote attacker can exploit this flaw by submitting encrypted requests with mismatched session identifiers to execute commands under another user's session, resulting in privilege escalation and unauthorized data access.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 15:40:08 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: verify transform SessionId matches the decrypted header

When an encrypted request comes in, the decryption key is picked by
the SessionId in the transform header, but the request is then
authorized under whatever session the decrypted inner header names.
Nothing ever compares the two, so on a connection with more than
one session a client can get a request decrypted with one session's
key and run it as another session. Encrypted requests are exempt
from signing too, so a valid AEAD tag is the only proof of session
identity, and it is checked against the wrong session.

MS-SMB2 says the server must check that the transform SessionId
matches the one in the decrypted SMB2 header and treat a mismatch
as a protocol error. Add that check in __handle_ksmbd_work() after
decryption, before dispatching: the message has to be at least one
fixed SMB2 header, the first operation must not set
SMB2_FLAGS_RELATED_OPERATIONS and its SessionId must match the
transform SessionId, and every following non-related operation in
a compound chain must carry the same SessionId. NextCommand
offsets must be 8-byte aligned and stay inside the message; the
bounds check is done by subtraction so it cannot wrap.

When the decrypted payload is a compression transform, the
existing decompression step runs first and the decompressed SMB2
message is checked instead, since a compression transform header
carries no SessionId.