Bug 2576950 (CVE-2026-99431)

Summary: CVE-2026-99431 kernel: kernel: ocfs2: Denial of Service via use-after-free during file system remount
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's OCFS2 (Oracle Cluster File System 2) file system. When remounting a file system from read-only to read-write, quota synchronization work may remain scheduled even if quota initialization fails and the associated quota data is freed. When the delayed work timer subsequently expires, the system attempts to access the released memory, causing a use-after-free condition. A local attacker with remount privileges could exploit this vulnerability to trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) via a kernel crash or potentially corrupt system memory.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 15:42:12 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: cancel quota sync work before freeing quota info

OCFS2 quota info owns dqi_sync_work and must outlive both its timer and
qsync_work_fn().  ocfs2_local_free_info() frees that owner without
cancelling the work, relying on the quota suspend/disable wrappers.

Loading quotas on a read-only to read-write remount can successfully queue
the work in ocfs2_global_read_info() and then fail while attaching a dquot
to an existing inode in add_dquot_ref().  The quota core unwinds that
failure directly through dquot_disable(), bypassing the OCFS2 wrapper:

  Remount task (s_umount write)        Timer/workqueue
  ocfs2_global_read_info()
    schedules dqi_sync_work
  add_dquot_ref() returns an error
  dquot_disable()
    ocfs2_local_free_info()
      frees oinfo
                                     delayed-work timer expires
                                     qsync_work_fn() reads oinfo

The timer core can then write to the freed embedded timer, or
qsync_work_fn() can read oinfo->dqi_gqinode before its s_umount trylock.
The outer ocfs2_disable_quotas() cleanup skips the failed type because
dquot_disable() has already cleared its loaded state.

Cancel dqi_sync_work synchronously at the start of
ocfs2_local_free_info(), before dropping the global inode or freeing any
owner state. The work is initialized whenever read_file_info() succeeds.
dquot_disable() holds s_umount for write, so the callback skips its quota
scan via down_read_trylock() and can finish without waiting for teardown.
The synchronous cancel also handles its self-rearm.

KASAN report as below:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
    Write of size 8 at addr ffff888111b0aad0 by task swapper/3/0

    Call Trace:
     <IRQ>
     dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
     print_report+0xce/0x630
     ? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
     ? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
     kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
     ? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
     __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
     ? __pfx___run_timers+0x10/0x10
     ? __lock_acquire+0x5a3/0x2140
     ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     timer_expire_remote+0xfa/0x160
     ? __pfx_timer_expire_remote+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160
     tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x4ba/0x9d0
     ? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
     ? tmigr_handle_remote+0x21a/0x340
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
     ? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
     __walk_groups_from+0x5a/0x160
     tmigr_handle_remote+0x24f/0x340
     ? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote+0x10/0x10
     ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
     run_timer_softirq+0x222/0x270
     ? __pfx_run_timer_softirq+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xb8/0x1a0
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     handle_softirqs+0x1fa/0x8d0
     ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __hrtimer_rearm_deferred+0x1fb/0x5d0
     __irq_exit_rcu+0x113/0x1e0
     irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
     sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
     </IRQ>
     <TASK>
     asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
     ? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0+0xc5/0xf0
     ? do_idle+0x3ae/0x650
     default_idle+0x9/0x10
     default_idle_call+0x6c/0xb0
     do_idle+0x3ae/0x650
     ? cpuhp_online_idle+0x9c/0xb0
     ? __pfx_do_idle+0x10/0x10
     ? __entry_text_end+0x1020f6/0x1020f9
     ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xeb/0x1a0
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160
     ? srso_a
---truncated---