Bug 2576978 (CVE-2026-99476)

Summary: CVE-2026-99476 kernel: kernel: Use-after-free in fsverity during error rollback
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's fsverity subsystem. When enabling file verification on ext4 or Btrfs file systems, an error condition could roll back verification operations after the file's verification flag has already been set. This behavior can result in a use-after-free vulnerability, where released memory continues to be accessed. A local user could exploit this flaw to cause a denial of service (DoS) or potentially execute arbitrary code.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 15:43:32 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fsverity: Set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible

Commit f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the
fsverity_info") changed the implementation of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to
make concurrent reads start going through fsverity verification slightly
earlier than they did before.

Instead of it happening when enable_verity() calls fsverity_set_info(),
it now happens when ->end_enable_verity() sets S_VERITY.

However, ext4 and btrfs can roll back verity after they set S_VERITY,
causing a use-after-free.

Fix that by making ext4 and btrfs set S_VERITY only after rollback is no
longer possible.  On failure, don't roll back S_VERITY, but do roll back
the filesystem-specific verity flag.

Also update enable_verity() to handle any future instances of this bug
more safely by warning and *not* freeing the fsverity_info.

Finally, tweak some comments.  Clarify one, and move information from
another to its proper place in the comment for ->end_enable_verity().