Bug 2577148 (CVE-2026-133226)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-133226 org.keycloak:keycloak-services: org.keycloak:keycloak-server-spi-private: Account resource sharing grants scopes outside the resource definition | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | low | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | low | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | aschwart, aszczucz, boliveir, drichtar, mposolda, pjindal, rmartinc, ssilvert, sthorger, vmuzikar |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in Keycloak. The Account API endpoint for sharing resources fails to verify whether owner-managed access is enabled and accepts permission scopes not assigned to the resource. An authenticated user can exploit this vulnerability to generate pre-granted permission tickets, causing Keycloak to bypass policy evaluation and issue access tokens with unauthorized scopes.
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
The Account API lets a resource owner share an owned resource through PUT /realms/{realm}/account/resources/{id}/permissions. This endpoint does not check whether owner-managed access is enabled for the resource, and it accepts any scope defined on the resource server, including scopes that are not assigned to the shared resource. The endpoint creates an already-granted permission ticket for that scope. When the requesting party then sends a ticketless UMA authorization request, Keycloak treats the granted ticket as authoritative, skips policy evaluation, and issues a Requesting Party Token (RPT) containing the unauthorized resource and scope. The corresponding Protection API path performs both checks, so the Account API is inconsistent with it. The impact is limited to resources owned by the attacker, and no access to another user's data was demonstrated.