Bug 2577265 (CVE-2026-133430)

Summary: CVE-2026-133430 keycloak: org.keycloak:keycloak-saml-adapter-core: org.keycloak:keycloak-saml-core: SAML LogoutRequest signature validation accepts a signed assertion nested in Extensions in place of a signature on the request
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: anujha, aschwart, asoldano, aszczucz, bbaranow, bmaxwell, boliveir, bstansbe, dlofthou, drichtar, istudens, ivassile, iweiss, jbaesner, mosmerov, mposolda, msvehla, nwallace, pberan, pesilva, pjindal, pmackay, rmartinc, rstancel, ssilvert, sthorger, thjenkin, vdosoudi, vmuzikar
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in Keycloak. This vulnerability allows an authenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service by terminating active sessions of arbitrary users. When processing Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) documents that lack a root signature, Keycloak accepts the request as long as any assertion within the document is signed, without verifying its context or placement. An attacker holding a validly signed assertion can embed it into an unsigned logout request for another user, causing Keycloak to accept the forged request and terminate the victim's session.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 20:12:31 UTC
A flaw was found in Keycloak's SAML signature validation. When a SAML document is not signed at its root, validation accepts it if every assertion found anywhere in the document is signed, without considering where the assertion sits or what kind of message it belongs to. An attacker who holds a legitimately signed assertion from the trusted identity provider can embed it in the Extensions element of an unsigned LogoutRequest that names another user. Keycloak accepts the request as signed and terminates the targeted user's sessions.