Bug 2577435 (CVE-2026-133475)

Summary: CVE-2026-133475 corosync: corosync: heap-based buffer overflow in memb_commit_token handling when msg_len exceeds commit_token_storage
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, security-response-team, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A heap-based buffer overflow was found in Corosync's Totem SRP membership commit token handling. The sanity check for memb_commit_token messages validates only minimum length and address-entry counts, not an upper bound against the fixed commit_token_storage buffer. A network-adjacent attacker who can deliver a crafted oversized commit token to a node in the GATHER membership state may overflow the heap-allocated totemsrp instance, leading to memory corruption and denial of service.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 21:38:18 UTC
A flaw was found in corosync. The membership commit token handler in exec/totemsrp.c copies a received memb_commit_token into a fixed-size heap buffer (commit_token_storage[40000]) using the full received message length (msg_len). check_memb_commit_token_sanity() only validates lower bounds (minimum header size and space for addr_entries) and caps addr_entries at PROCESSOR_COUNT_MAX; it does not reject messages larger than commit_token_storage. A crafted commit token with a valid small address list and trailing padding above 40000 bytes can therefore overflow the heap-allocated totemsrp_instance when a node is in MEMB_STATE_GATHER and the token matches membership and ring-sequence gates. Over knet, messages can be up to the default 64 KiB netmtu, allowing roughly 24 KiB of attacker-controlled out-of-bounds write. This is distinct from CVE-2026-35091 (incorrect success return on truncated messages) and CVE-2026-81666 (32-bit integer overflow in required_len). Impact is heap memory corruption and denial of service of the Corosync daemon; code execution was not demonstrated. Reported via PSIRTSUPT-30664 by Adam Bedard. Upstream maintainer Jan Friesse confirmed the issue and provided a proposed fix that adds an upper-bound length check and moves alloca after the sanity check.