Bug 2577633 (CVE-2026-99694)

Summary: CVE-2026-99694 kernel: kernel: File system metadata corruption via out-of-bounds read in OCFS2
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's OCFS2 (Oracle Cluster File System 2) file system. An out-of-bounds read vulnerability occurs when dividing an empty extended attribute bucket, causing invalid hash keys to be written to file system structures. A local user could exploit this issue during extended attribute operations to cause file system metadata corruption, resulting in stored attributes becoming inaccessible or duplicated.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-20 06:05:22 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: do not index before the entry array when dividing an empty bucket

ocfs2_divide_xattr_bucket() appends an empty bucket carrying a sentinel
hash when the source bucket has no divide position, taking that hash
from xh_entries[start - 1].  ocfs2_xattr_find_divide_pos() returns count
when every entry shares one hash, and its loop does not run at all for
count < 2, so an empty bucket comes back with start == count == 0 and
the read is xh_entries[-1].

That is outside the __counted_by_le(xh_count) bounds of xh_entries[] and
lands on the header, so the value picked up is
xh_count | xh_free_start << 16.  One above it is written into the new
bucket's xh_entries[0] and committed, which leaves a bucket whose first
hash does not follow the bucket before it.  ocfs2_xattr_bucket_find()
binary searches on xh_entries[0], so the broken key hides the range the
sentinel was meant to cover: getxattr() answers -ENODATA for an
attribute that is stored, and an insert can go to the wrong bucket and
leave two copies of a name.  The cross cluster divide hands the same
value back as a tree record's e_cpos, which then claims a hash range it
does not cover.

Read xh_entries[0] instead.  The branch is only reached when every entry
shares one hash, so for a non-empty bucket it holds the same value, and
for an empty one it is the slot that carries the bucket key.

An empty bucket reaches the divide from
ocfs2_check_xattr_bucket_collision(), which reports no collision for
one, through ocfs2_add_new_xattr_bucket() and
ocfs2_extend_xattr_bucket().  It does not take a failed set to get
there: a divide that finds no position is itself what leaves an empty
sentinel bucket behind, and a later extend can pick it as the target.