Bug 2577749 (CVE-2026-99756)

Summary: CVE-2026-99756 kernel: kernel: btrfs: Unintended subvolume deletion via concurrent rename race condition
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Btrfs file system within the Linux kernel. A local user can exploit a race condition—a timing conflict between concurrent operations—by renaming a subvolume while another subvolume is being deleted by its identifier. Because the kernel fails to verify that the resolved directory matches the requested subvolume identifier before removal, this flaw can cause the deletion of the wrong subvolume and result in unintended data loss.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-20 06:11:46 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: prevent deleting the wrong subvolume by ID

When deleting a subvolume by ID, btrfs_ioctl_snap_destroy() first
resolves the requested ID to a name, then looks up that name again
under the parent directory lock.

A concurrent rename can change which subvolume is associated with
the name between these operations. Since the deletion path does not
verify the ID of the resolved subvolume, it can delete a different
subvolume while leaving the requested one intact.

This was reproduced by repeatedly exchanging the names of two
subvolumes using renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE) while deleting one of
them by ID. The wrong subvolume was deleted in 9 out of 14 independent
tests.

Fix this by checking that the resolved subvolume ID matches the
requested ID while holding the parent directory lock. Return -EAGAIN
on a mismatch so that userspace can retry the operation instead of
being told that the requested subvolume does not exist.