Bug 2577768 (CVE-2026-99772)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-99772 kernel: kernel: Denial of service via race condition in DRM CRTC fence handling | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | medium | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Direct Rendering Manager (DRM) subsystem. A race condition can occur when querying synchronization fence details while the fence is concurrently signaled, triggering an invalid kernel assertion check. A local user could exploit this vulnerability by interacting with synchronization files, causing a system crash and leading to a denial of service (DoS).
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name() Since commit 541c8f2468b9 ("dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3"), I'm seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc's fence_to_crtc() via drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly: Call trace: panic+0x58/0x5c die+0x160/0x178 bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4 call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0 do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74 el1_brk64+0x34/0x54 el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88 drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P) sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc This looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following: +++ snip +++ thread A thread B ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) sync_file_ioctl() sync_file_get_name() dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name() ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops) if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag()) ops->get_driver_name(fence) i.e. drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() test_and_set_bit(SIGNALED) RCU_INIT_POINTER(fence->ops, NULL) drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence->ops) != &drm_crtc_fence_ops) +++ snap +++ In other words, a fence's ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal, which wasn't the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON() triggers. Simply drop the BUG_ON() as it's usage of fence ops is invalid now, and because using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an unacceptable way to handle a failure. Note that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same problem and is fixed by this patch as well.