Bug 2578919 (CVE-2026-115407)

Summary: CVE-2026-115407 github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2: github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11: github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11: github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11: crypto11: Information disclosure via missing GCM nonce validation
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dhanak, dpaolell, drosa, dsimansk, eborisov, gbenhaim, jdelft, jupierce, kingland, lball, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, mnovotny, ngough, niyer, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, sausingh, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, twaugh, veshanka, vlaad
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in crypto11. The library does not properly validate nonce or initialization vector (IV) lengths during Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) encryption, allowing empty nonces to be passed to cryptographic tokens. When used with tokens that accept zero-length IVs, repeated encryption operations reuse the same cryptographic keystream. An attacker can exploit this condition to decrypt sensitive ciphertext or forge authenticated messages.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-20 16:21:27 UTC
In `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `<= 2.0.0-rc8` (and the deprecated v1 module paths `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11 <= 1.6.8`, `github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11 <= 1.7.0-rc1` and `github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11 <= 1.2.5`), the `cipher.AEAD` returned by `SecretKey.NewGCM()` passes whatever nonce it is given straight to `CK_GCM_PARAMS` without checking its length against `NonceSize()`, and accepts an empty nonce. On a token that accepts a zero-length GCM IV — SoftHSM2 does — every `Seal` with an empty nonce encrypts under the same IV, reusing the keystream and exposing the GHASH authentication key, which allows forgeries. Separately, `Config.UseGCMIVFromHSM` sends a NULL IV with length zero to the token unless `GCMIVFromHSMControl.SupplyIvForHSMGCMEncrypt` is also set, so the token has nowhere to write the IV it generates: a `Seal` with a non-empty nonce panics after the plaintext has already been encrypted, and a `Seal` with an empty nonce returns ciphertext under an empty IV without error. On the v1 line HSM-IV mode additionally never copies the token-generated IV back to the caller, so the caller keeps its own nonce while the data was encrypted under another one.