Bug 2579839

Summary: CVE-2026-101340 perl-Net-DNS: Query ID predictable from a short sequence of observations [fedora-all]
Product: [Fedora] Fedora Reporter: Avinash Hanwate <ahanwate>
Component: perl-Net-DNSAssignee: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa>
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: rawhideCC: mspacek, paul.wouters, perl-devel, rstrode
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security, SecurityTracking
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Hardware: Unspecified   
OS: Unspecified   
Whiteboard: {"flaws": ["614ff429-439d-468d-a420-6f4557972c54"]}
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Bug Depends On:    
Bug Blocks: 2579647    

Description Avinash Hanwate 2026-11-21 08:55:02 UTC
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process.

Net::DNS uses a 16-bit query ID to match responses to the corresponding requests.  In versions up to and including 1.57, the ID is obtained from Perl's built-in rand() function.  An attacker that can observe the sequence of query IDs is able to expose the internal state of the PNRG and hence predict query IDs before they are transmitted.  The victim Net::DNS instance is then exposed to forged responses injected by the attacker.  Note that the deduplication cache in 1.57 has no impact on the feasibility of this attack.