Bug 35634
Summary: | a new LPRng exploit? | ||
---|---|---|---|
Product: | [Retired] Red Hat Linux | Reporter: | Paul Johnson <pauljohn> |
Component: | LPRng | Assignee: | Crutcher Dunnavant <crutcher> |
Status: | CLOSED NOTABUG | QA Contact: | David Lawrence <dkl> |
Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
Priority: | medium | ||
Version: | 7.0 | Keywords: | Security |
Target Milestone: | --- | ||
Target Release: | --- | ||
Hardware: | i386 | ||
OS: | Linux | ||
Whiteboard: | |||
Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
Last Closed: | 2001-04-11 14:17:56 UTC | Type: | --- |
Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
Embargoed: |
Description
Paul Johnson
2001-04-11 14:17:52 UTC
No, but someone is attacking. The exploit in question was a vulnerability in the way LPRng logged messages, namely that it treated an error string (the bad request line) as a format string. For C hackers, this means the differance between: printf(str) and printf("%s", str) to exploit it, you have to get the program to try and print the string. So if you see error message with formatting escapes like: %.21u \s \220 you know that you are /not/ vulnerable, because those commands would have been interpretted, instead of printed, on a vulnerable box. |