Bug 475803
| Summary: | fingerprint authentication in PolicyKit dialogs leads to lockup | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Matthias Clasen <mclasen> |
| Component: | PolicyKit | Assignee: | David Zeuthen <davidz> |
| Status: | CLOSED WONTFIX | QA Contact: | Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa> |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | low | ||
| Version: | 11 | CC: | bnocera, cg, davidz, jason, mclasen |
| Target Milestone: | --- | ||
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2010-06-28 10:55:48 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
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Description
Matthias Clasen
2008-12-10 15:32:16 UTC
By default fprintd should allow users in an active session on the local console access. I mean, why is it useful to lock down access to local users? I can see why it's useful to lock down access to remote users but... (it's actually a serious question, what kind of threat model are we looking at here? I'm not a domain expert so I don't know.) Also, I think it's a pam_fprintd bug that there's a loop. If polkit tells fprintd that the user isn't authorized, it should tell it to pam_fprintd. Then pam_fprintd should back out and PAM should fall back to unix_passwd. (Then you can enter your UNIX password in order to then swipe your finger or type your password again! Very useless, I know!) (In reply to comment #1) > By default fprintd should allow users in an active session on the local console > access. I mean, why is it useful to lock down access to local users? It's not useful, and that's not what we do by default. but it's possible using the PolicyKit GNOME UI, so any admin could screw up their system. > I can see > why it's useful to lock down access to remote users but... > (it's actually a serious question, what kind of threat model are we looking at > here? I'm not a domain expert so I don't know.) > > Also, I think it's a pam_fprintd bug that there's a loop. We exit the loop as soon as the call to VerifyStart fails. > If polkit tells > fprintd that the user isn't authorized, it should tell it to pam_fprintd. Then > pam_fprintd should back out and PAM should fall back to unix_passwd. Which is what it does. > (Then you can enter your UNIX password in order to then swipe your finger or > type your password again! Very useless, I know!) So do I. This bug wouldn't happen by default, only when the admin changes the default PolicyKit config. This bug appears to have been reported against 'rawhide' during the Fedora 11 development cycle. Changing version to '11'. More information and reason for this action is here: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/BugZappers/HouseKeeping I believe this is fixed in PolicyKit 0.92. Not sure if it is feasible (or worthwhile) to consider backporting the fix to the F11 polkit. I'm not sure if I understand the comment #2 correctly, but the definitely happens here once I enrol a fingerprint for root. thinkfinger worked fine btw. David was mentioning changes in the PAM stack for the polkit in F12. Yeah, it works in F-12. On the other hand, there is no way to auth with password without failing the swipe 3 times (upek_ts), but that's a separate issue. This message is a reminder that Fedora 11 is nearing its end of life. Approximately 30 (thirty) days from now Fedora will stop maintaining and issuing updates for Fedora 11. It is Fedora's policy to close all bug reports from releases that are no longer maintained. At that time this bug will be closed as WONTFIX if it remains open with a Fedora 'version' of '11'. Package Maintainer: If you wish for this bug to remain open because you plan to fix it in a currently maintained version, simply change the 'version' to a later Fedora version prior to Fedora 11's end of life. Bug Reporter: Thank you for reporting this issue and we are sorry that we may not be able to fix it before Fedora 11 is end of life. If you would still like to see this bug fixed and are able to reproduce it against a later version of Fedora please change the 'version' of this bug to the applicable version. If you are unable to change the version, please add a comment here and someone will do it for you. Although we aim to fix as many bugs as possible during every release's lifetime, sometimes those efforts are overtaken by events. Often a more recent Fedora release includes newer upstream software that fixes bugs or makes them obsolete. The process we are following is described here: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/BugZappers/HouseKeeping Fedora 11 changed to end-of-life (EOL) status on 2010-06-25. Fedora 11 is no longer maintained, which means that it will not receive any further security or bug fix updates. As a result we are closing this bug. If you can reproduce this bug against a currently maintained version of Fedora please feel free to reopen this bug against that version. Thank you for reporting this bug and we are sorry it could not be fixed. |