Bug 572007 (CVE-2010-0729)

Summary: CVE-2010-0729 kernel: ia64: ptrace: peek_or_poke requests miss ptrace_check_attach()
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: Eugene Teo (Security Response) <eteo>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team>
Status: CLOSED ERRATA QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: bhu, dhoward, jolsa, lgoncalv, lwang, ohudlick, onestero, plyons, tao, williams
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: ia64   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: 2015-08-24 16:05:00 UTC Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On: 567321, 572008, 572009    
Bug Blocks:    

Description Eugene Teo (Security Response) 2010-03-10 00:20:05 UTC
(Internal git) Commit c31d1f3f363a5c3b6dbd4d6daa36fa0f4273e948 "a64: fix deadlock in ia64 sys_ptrace" moved ptrace_check_attach() from find_thread_for_addr() to tasklist-is-not-held area. However it introduced other problems.

In the likely case, when rbs_child == child, ptrace_check_attach() is never called. Otherwise we do ptrace_check_attach(rbs_child) twice. This means that any peek/poke request can silently fail and fool the tracer.

With this patch the logic is
	ptrace_check_attach(child);

	if (rbs_child != child) {
		// we should use rbs_child ...
		if (!ptrace_check_attach(rbs_child))
			child = rbs_child;

		// but if check_attach() fails we continue to
		// use child, we are doing as well as we can.
	}

To simplify the error-handling and the logic, this patch changes the code to detect the likely rbs_child == child case earlier, right after find_thread_for_addr().

This only affects Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.

Comment 5 Eugene Teo (Security Response) 2010-03-10 00:31:56 UTC
From Oleg, the problem is, ptrace_check_attach() also verifies the caller is the tracer and thus it have the rights to do "anything it wants" with the tracee.

But since ptrace_check_attach() can be missed, any user can do ptrace() on any target even without PTRACE_ATTACH.

Comment 6 errata-xmlrpc 2010-05-05 13:05:12 UTC
This issue has been addressed in following products:

  Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4

Via RHSA-2010:0394 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2010-0394.html