DescriptionEugene Teo (Security Response)
2010-03-10 00:20:05 UTC
(Internal git) Commit c31d1f3f363a5c3b6dbd4d6daa36fa0f4273e948 "a64: fix deadlock in ia64 sys_ptrace" moved ptrace_check_attach() from find_thread_for_addr() to tasklist-is-not-held area. However it introduced other problems.
In the likely case, when rbs_child == child, ptrace_check_attach() is never called. Otherwise we do ptrace_check_attach(rbs_child) twice. This means that any peek/poke request can silently fail and fool the tracer.
With this patch the logic is
ptrace_check_attach(child);
if (rbs_child != child) {
// we should use rbs_child ...
if (!ptrace_check_attach(rbs_child))
child = rbs_child;
// but if check_attach() fails we continue to
// use child, we are doing as well as we can.
}
To simplify the error-handling and the logic, this patch changes the code to detect the likely rbs_child == child case earlier, right after find_thread_for_addr().
This only affects Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.
Comment 5Eugene Teo (Security Response)
2010-03-10 00:31:56 UTC
From Oleg, the problem is, ptrace_check_attach() also verifies the caller is the tracer and thus it have the rights to do "anything it wants" with the tracee.
But since ptrace_check_attach() can be missed, any user can do ptrace() on any target even without PTRACE_ATTACH.