Bug 58069

Summary:	default root path for sshd is security hazard
Product:	[Retired] Red Hat Linux	Reporter:	Tom Manos <tmanos>
Component:	openssh	Assignee:	Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin>
Status:	CLOSED WORKSFORME	QA Contact:	Brian Brock <bbrock>
Severity:	medium	Docs Contact:
Priority:	medium
Version:	7.2	Keywords:	Security
Target Milestone:	---
Target Release:	---
Hardware:	i386
OS:	Linux
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version:		Doc Type:	Bug Fix
Doc Text:		Story Points:	---
Clone Of:		Environment:
Last Closed:	2002-01-07 19:45:45 UTC	Type:	---
Regression:	---	Mount Type:	---
Documentation:	---	CRM:
Verified Versions:		Category:	---
oVirt Team:	---	RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team:	---	Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description Tom Manos 2002-01-07 19:45:40 UTC

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Description of problem:
the sshd binary in the latest openssh server, openssh-server-2.9p2-12.i386.rpm
was compiled with /usr/local/sbin as the first directory in root's path and
/usr/local/bin as the first directory in a normal user's path. Was this your
intent? Seems like a horrid security hole to me.

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):


How reproducible:
Always

Steps to Reproduce:
1. Just install the RPM
2.
3.
	

Actual Results:  Log in as root or as a normal user and check your $PATH

Expected Results:  I would want my $PATH to start with /bin:/usr/bin......

Additional info:

Comment 1 Nalin Dahyabhai 2002-01-18 18:00:11 UTC

This is done to match the behavior of login.  Neither /usr/local/bin nor
/usr/local/sbin are writable by users other than root, so I don't consider it a
problem.  If the PATH as set by login is different, then sshd should be modified
to match.  I'm not adverse to changing it, but the current behavior is intentional.