Bug 666333
| Summary: | SELinux is preventing /usr/bin/kino from using the 'execstack' accesses on a process. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Klaus Meyer <ek7ki> |
| Component: | selinux-policy | Assignee: | Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl> |
| Status: | CLOSED DUPLICATE | QA Contact: | Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa> |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | low | ||
| Version: | 14 | CC: | dwalsh, jp.grossglauser, mgrepl |
| Target Milestone: | --- | ||
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | i386 | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | setroubleshoot_trace_hash:23c5da9ca64529e8bf087c8216451f0b40e303d8b399ff36cb52b1473b410cfa | ||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2010-12-30 13:35:50 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
*** This bug has been marked as a duplicate of bug 652297 *** I got /usr/lib/libxvidcore.so.4 as a suspect library by executing findececstack /usr/bin/kino then I forced this avc by excecuting execstack -s /usr/lib/libxvidcore.so.4 thanks Dan; sorry I have to correct me : findexecstack /usr /bin/kino |
SELinux is preventing /usr/bin/kino from using the 'execstack' accesses on a process. ***** Plugin allow_execstack (53.1 confidence) suggests ******************** If you do not think /usr/bin/kino should need to map stack memory that is both writable and executable. Then you need to report a bug. This is a potentially dangerous access. Do contact your security administrator and report this issue. ***** Plugin catchall_boolean (42.6 confidence) suggests ******************* If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla Then you must tell SELinux about this by enabling the 'allow_execstack' boolean. Do setsebool -P allow_execstack 1 ***** Plugin catchall (5.76 confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that kino should be allowed execstack access on processes labeled unconfined_t by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep /usr/bin/kino /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1 023 Target Context unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1 023 Target Objects Unknown [ process ] Source kino Source Path /usr/bin/kino Port <Unbekannt> Host (removed) Source RPM Packages kino-1.3.4-4.fc14 Target RPM Packages Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.9.7-19.fc14 Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Enforcing Host Name (removed) Platform Linux (removed) 2.6.35.10-74.fc14.i686 #1 SMP Thu Dec 23 16:17:40 UTC 2010 i686 i686 Alert Count 302 First Seen Mi 29 Dez 2010 17:33:54 CET Last Seen Do 30 Dez 2010 09:08:36 CET Local ID 11b95f15-fb57-4564-ab05-50905f42d372 Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1293696516.702:30233): avc: denied { execstack } for pid=2440 comm="kino" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=process kino,unconfined_t,unconfined_t,process,execstack type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1293696516.702:30233): arch=i386 syscall=mprotect success=no exit=EACCES a0=bff7a000 a1=1000 a2=1000007 a3=bff78f00 items=0 ppid=1 pid=2440 auid=500 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=(none) ses=1 comm=kino exe=/usr/bin/kino subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) kino,unconfined_t,unconfined_t,process,execstack #============= unconfined_t ============== #!!!! This avc can be allowed using the boolean 'allow_execstack' allow unconfined_t self:process execstack;