| Summary: | SELinux is preventing /opt/rapid7/nexpose/nsc/.DLLCACHE/nexserv from using the 'execstack' accesses on a process. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Katalyst <katalystk> |
| Component: | selinux-policy | Assignee: | Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl> |
| Status: | CLOSED INSUFFICIENT_DATA | QA Contact: | Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa> |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | unspecified | ||
| Version: | 14 | CC: | dwalsh, mgrepl |
| Target Milestone: | --- | ||
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | x86_64 | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | setroubleshoot_trace_hash:22df5fe67881dd0b9106140a303381918c52aead0c04ddc8bd498c09878326bc | ||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2011-03-11 15:29:16 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
Do you know what this is /opt/rapid7/nexpose/nsc/.DLLCACHE/nexserv? Is it written in Java? You could label it execmem_exec_t or turn off the access check. # semanage fcontext -a -t execmem_exec_t /opt/rapid7/nexpose/nsc/.DLLCACHE/nexserv # restorecon -R -v /opt/rapid7 |
SELinux is preventing /opt/rapid7/nexpose/nsc/.DLLCACHE/nexserv from using the 'execstack' accesses on a process. ***** Plugin allow_execstack (53.1 confidence) suggests ******************** If you believe that None should not require execstack Then you should clear the execstack flag and see if /opt/rapid7/nexpose/nsc/.DLLCACHE/nexserv works correctly. Report this as a bug on None. You can clear the exestack flag by executing: Do execstack -c None ***** Plugin catchall_boolean (42.6 confidence) suggests ******************* If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla Then you must tell SELinux about this by enabling the 'allow_execstack' boolean. Do setsebool -P allow_execstack 1 ***** Plugin catchall (5.76 confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that nexserv should be allowed execstack access on processes labeled unconfined_t by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep nexserv /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1 023 Target Context unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1 023 Target Objects Unknown [ process ] Source nexserv Source Path /opt/rapid7/nexpose/nsc/.DLLCACHE/nexserv Port <Unknown> Host (removed) Source RPM Packages Target RPM Packages Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.9.7-29.fc14 Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Enforcing Host Name (removed) Platform Linux (removed) 2.6.35.11-83.fc14.x86_64 #1 SMP Mon Feb 7 07:06:44 UTC 2011 x86_64 x86_64 Alert Count 4 First Seen Fri 11 Feb 2011 06:45:25 PM IST Last Seen Fri 11 Feb 2011 06:45:25 PM IST Local ID d38574a7-0b06-4f79-8ec8-f569a0eb4976 Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1297430125.952:449): avc: denied { execstack } for pid=22109 comm="nexserv" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=process type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1297430125.952:449): arch=x86_64 syscall=mprotect success=no exit=EACCES a0=7fff53827000 a1=1000 a2=1000007 a3=36ac81f000 items=0 ppid=22043 pid=22109 auid=500 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts1 ses=1 comm=nexserv exe=/opt/rapid7/nexpose/nsc/.DLLCACHE/nexserv subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Hash: nexserv,unconfined_t,unconfined_t,process,execstack audit2allow #============= unconfined_t ============== #!!!! This avc can be allowed using the boolean 'allow_execstack' allow unconfined_t self:process execstack; audit2allow -R #============= unconfined_t ============== #!!!! This avc can be allowed using the boolean 'allow_execstack' allow unconfined_t self:process execstack;