| Summary: | SELinux is preventing /home/NwB/maple14/bin.IBM_INTEL_LINUX/mserver from using the 'execstack' accesses on a process. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Noah Birge <nbirge> |
| Component: | selinux-policy | Assignee: | Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl> |
| Status: | CLOSED NOTABUG | QA Contact: | Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa> |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | unspecified | ||
| Version: | 14 | CC: | dwalsh, mgrepl, nbirge, vmarusov |
| Target Milestone: | --- | ||
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | i386 | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | setroubleshoot_trace_hash:f0157ffb58440cc546969d8820e61803d59bba6d36ddd2028bad5c925cb6872e | ||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2011-02-25 12:12:34 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
If you are going to trust applications that you download into your homedir to execstack then you need to turn on the allow_execstack boolean. |
SELinux is preventing /home/NwB/maple14/bin.IBM_INTEL_LINUX/mserver from using the 'execstack' accesses on a process. ***** Plugin allow_execstack (53.1 confidence) suggests ******************** If you believe that None should not require execstack Then you should clear the execstack flag and see if /home/NwB/maple14/bin.IBM_INTEL_LINUX/mserver works correctly. Report this as a bug on None. You can clear the exestack flag by executing: Do execstack -c None ***** Plugin catchall_boolean (42.6 confidence) suggests ******************* If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla Then you must tell SELinux about this by enabling the 'allow_execstack' boolean. Do setsebool -P allow_execstack 1 ***** Plugin catchall (5.76 confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that mserver should be allowed execstack access on processes labeled unconfined_t by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep mserver /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1 023 Target Context unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1 023 Target Objects Unknown [ process ] Source mserver Source Path /home/NwB/maple14/bin.IBM_INTEL_LINUX/mserver Port <Unknown> Host (removed) Source RPM Packages coreutils-8.5-7.fc14 Target RPM Packages Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.9.7-29.fc14 Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Enforcing Host Name (removed) Platform Linux NwB-I 2.6.35.11-83.fc14.i686 #1 SMP Mon Feb 7 07:04:18 UTC 2011 i686 i686 Alert Count 11 First Seen Wed 23 Feb 2011 06:22:08 PM EST Last Seen Fri 25 Feb 2011 12:09:38 AM EST Local ID 79bff520-66b8-4fe1-931d-7afda03cc268 Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1298610578.40:19584): avc: denied { execstack } for pid=17339 comm="expr" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=process type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1298610578.40:19584): arch=i386 syscall=mprotect success=no exit=EACCES a0=bffab000 a1=1000 a2=1000007 a3=bffab63c items=0 ppid=17332 pid=17339 auid=500 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=(none) ses=1 comm=expr exe=/usr/bin/expr subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Hash: mserver,unconfined_t,unconfined_t,process,execstack audit2allow #============= unconfined_t ============== #!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy allow unconfined_t self:process execstack; audit2allow -R #============= unconfined_t ============== #!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy allow unconfined_t self:process execstack;