Bug 695341

Summary: SELinux is preventing /bin/bash from 'add_name' accesses on the directory /var/run/abrt/saved_core_pattern.
Product: [Fedora] Fedora Reporter: Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl>
Component: abrtAssignee: Nikola Pajkovsky <npajkovs>
Status: CLOSED WONTFIX QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa>
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: 15CC: anton, dhoward, dvlasenk, dwalsh, iprikryl, jmoskovc, kklic, mgrepl, mtoman, npajkovs
Target Milestone: ---   
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: x86_64   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard: setroubleshoot_trace_hash:e2644e70d0177c168145bea2936bcdc1cedbc22f0394aab7b7f35b7db5b85a26
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: 2012-08-06 20:02:56 UTC Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:

Description Miroslav Grepl 2011-04-11 12:20:41 UTC
SELinux is preventing /bin/bash from 'add_name' accesses on the directory /var/run/abrt/saved_core_pattern.

*****  Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests  ***************************

If you believe that bash should be allowed add_name access on the saved_core_pattern directory by default.
Then you should report this as a bug.
You can generate a local policy module to allow this access.
Do
allow this access for now by executing:
# grep abrt-ccpp /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol
# semodule -i mypol.pp

Additional Information:
Source Context                system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0
Target Context                system_u:object_r:abrt_var_run_t:s0
Target Objects                /var/run/abrt/saved_core_pattern [ dir ]
Source                        abrt-ccpp
Source Path                   /bin/bash
Port                          <Unknown>
Host                          (removed)
Source RPM Packages           bash-4.2.8-2.fc15
Target RPM Packages           
Policy RPM                    selinux-policy-3.9.16-13.fc15
Selinux Enabled               True
Policy Type                   targeted
Enforcing Mode                Enforcing
Host Name                     (removed)
Platform                      Linux (removed) 2.6.38.2-9.fc15.x86_64 #1 SMP Wed
                              Mar 30 16:55:57 UTC 2011 x86_64 x86_64
Alert Count                   7
First Seen                    Sat 09 Apr 2011 01:00:07 PM CEST
Last Seen                     Mon 11 Apr 2011 01:56:02 PM CEST
Local ID                      5885ccc3-c13a-4175-bc0d-8f7afa2a4c74

Raw Audit Messages
type=AVC msg=audit(1302522962.322:32): avc:  denied  { add_name } for  pid=1050 comm="abrt-ccpp" name="saved_core_pattern" scontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:abrt_var_run_t:s0 tclass=dir


type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1302522962.322:32): arch=x86_64 syscall=open success=no exit=EACCES a0=955720 a1=241 a2=1b6 a3=fffffffffffffff0 items=1 ppid=1 pid=1050 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm=abrt-ccpp exe=/bin/bash subj=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 key=(null)

type=CWD msg=audit(1302522962.322:32): cwd=/

type=PATH msg=audit(1302522962.322:32): item=0 name=/var/run/abrt/saved_core_pattern inode=15095 dev=00:12 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:abrt_var_run_t:s0

Hash: abrt-ccpp,initrc_t,abrt_var_run_t,dir,add_name

audit2allow

#============= initrc_t ==============
allow initrc_t abrt_var_run_t:dir add_name;

audit2allow -R

#============= initrc_t ==============
allow initrc_t abrt_var_run_t:dir add_name;

Comment 1 Miroslav Grepl 2011-04-11 12:26:08 UTC
The problem is the abrt-ccpp init script is used to setup ABRT stuff directly.

Could it be done using a script which would be executed by abrt-ccpp init script?

Then we can label a script and add a transition.

Comment 2 Daniel Walsh 2011-04-11 13:25:48 UTC
Sure, although not sure how much security that adds.  If we had a tightly locked down initrc_t, would having the ability to write to /var/run/abrt, give an init script a significant security advantage?

Comment 3 Miroslav Grepl 2011-04-11 13:43:39 UTC
Yes, I can allow it for this case. 

But AFAIK ABRT will use more scripts to setup various things on the system.

I opened the bug to discussion.

Comment 4 Daniel Walsh 2011-04-11 16:04:50 UTC
I guess the easiest thing would be to label the script abrt_exec_t for now.

Comment 5 Fedora End Of Life 2012-08-06 20:02:56 UTC
This message is a notice that Fedora 15 is now at end of life. Fedora 
has stopped maintaining and issuing updates for Fedora 15. It is 
Fedora's policy to close all bug reports from releases that are no 
longer maintained.  At this time, all open bugs with a Fedora 'version'
of '15' have been closed as WONTFIX.

(Please note: Our normal process is to give advanced warning of this 
occurring, but we forgot to do that. A thousand apologies.)

Package Maintainer: If you wish for this bug to remain open because you
plan to fix it in a currently maintained version, feel free to reopen 
this bug and simply change the 'version' to a later Fedora version.

Bug Reporter: Thank you for reporting this issue and we are sorry that 
we were unable to fix it before Fedora 15 reached end of life. If you 
would still like to see this bug fixed and are able to reproduce it 
against a later version of Fedora, you are encouraged to click on 
"Clone This Bug" (top right of this page) and open it against that 
version of Fedora.

Although we aim to fix as many bugs as possible during every release's 
lifetime, sometimes those efforts are overtaken by events.  Often a 
more recent Fedora release includes newer upstream software that fixes 
bugs or makes them obsolete.

The process we are following is described here: 
http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/BugZappers/HouseKeeping

Comment 6 Fedora End Of Life 2012-08-06 20:02:56 UTC
This message is a notice that Fedora 15 is now at end of life. Fedora 
has stopped maintaining and issuing updates for Fedora 15. It is 
Fedora's policy to close all bug reports from releases that are no 
longer maintained.  At this time, all open bugs with a Fedora 'version'
of '15' have been closed as WONTFIX.

(Please note: Our normal process is to give advanced warning of this 
occurring, but we forgot to do that. A thousand apologies.)

Package Maintainer: If you wish for this bug to remain open because you
plan to fix it in a currently maintained version, feel free to reopen 
this bug and simply change the 'version' to a later Fedora version.

Bug Reporter: Thank you for reporting this issue and we are sorry that 
we were unable to fix it before Fedora 15 reached end of life. If you 
would still like to see this bug fixed and are able to reproduce it 
against a later version of Fedora, you are encouraged to click on 
"Clone This Bug" (top right of this page) and open it against that 
version of Fedora.

Although we aim to fix as many bugs as possible during every release's 
lifetime, sometimes those efforts are overtaken by events.  Often a 
more recent Fedora release includes newer upstream software that fixes 
bugs or makes them obsolete.

The process we are following is described here: 
http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/BugZappers/HouseKeeping