Bug 743752 (CVE-2011-3603)
Summary: | CVE-2011-3603 radvd: daemon would not fail on privsep_init() causing it to run with full root privileges | ||
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Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | Vincent Danen <vdanen> |
Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team> |
Status: | CLOSED NOTABUG | QA Contact: | |
Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
Priority: | medium | ||
Version: | unspecified | CC: | jskala, security-response-team |
Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
Target Release: | --- | ||
Hardware: | All | ||
OS: | Linux | ||
Whiteboard: | |||
Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
Last Closed: | 2011-10-14 09:31:21 UTC | Type: | --- |
Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
Embargoed: | |||
Bug Depends On: | 744116 | ||
Bug Blocks: |
Description
Vincent Danen
2011-10-05 21:47:15 UTC
The version of radvd shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 and 5, does not have the "--singleprocess" config option, hence there is no privilege separation. The vulnerable code privsec_init() hence does not exists and therefore they are not vulnerable. The issue affects the version of radvd shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6. This issue affects the version of radvd shipped with Fedora 14 and 15. Created radvd tracking bugs for this issue Affects: fedora-all [bug 744116] Further investigations have revealed that this is not a security flaw at all. If privsep_init() fails, the only impact it would have is that radvd would run as a single process as radvd user (assuming "--username radvd" was used, which is the default configuration) More information at: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.oss.general/5973/focus=6015 Statement: A failure in privsep_init() does not cause radvd to run with full root privileges when invoked with the --username option specifying an unprivileged user. Rather it will run as a single process as the specified (unprivileged) radvd user, causing this issue to have no security impact (no unintended privilege elevation). |