Bug 859392

This behavior is controlled by PolicyKit.

The problem is that USB redirection requires raw USB-device access, which can be used to for example circumvent filesystem permissions on a USB attached mass-storage device, something which the user normally cannot do (try attaching an ext2/3/4 formatted usb device and then writing to it as a regular user, or reading a file without read permissions).

To avoid causing security issues the default PolicyKit policy for this requires root rights, note that if a user
is member of the wheel group he only needs to type his own password.

The best we can do is to document how to edit the Policy so that PolicyKit will allow the raw USB device access without prompting including a warning in the documentation about the security implications of this.

I've a few short instructions on editing the policy for this here:
http://hansdegoede.livejournal.com/11936.html

Can we set this setting as yes by default and document how a user can lock it down.
The purpose of the package is to provide USB remoting so I don't think anyone would be surprised by the fact that the package allows raw access to the device.

So two actions from my point of view

1. Change default to yes
2. Provide manpage/documentation explaining how to change it

(In reply to comment #2)
> Can we set this setting as yes by default and document how a user can lock
> it down.
> The purpose of the package is to provide USB remoting so I don't think
> anyone would be surprised by the fact that the package allows raw access to
> the device.
> 
> So two actions from my point of view
> 
> 1. Change default to yes

As said before this has security implications. If you can get permission for this from the security team I will happily change this, but until then it stays as it is.

(In reply to comment #3)
> (In reply to comment #2)
> > Can we set this setting as yes by default and document how a user can lock
> > it down.
> > The purpose of the package is to provide USB remoting so I don't think
> > anyone would be surprised by the fact that the package allows raw access to
> > the device.
> > 
> > So two actions from my point of view
> > 
> > 1. Change default to yes
> 
> As said before this has security implications. If you can get permission for
> this from the security team I will happily change this, but until then it
> stays as it is.

This has been in needinfo for 2 months without any response -> closing.

(In reply to comment #3)
> (In reply to comment #2)
> > Can we set this setting as yes by default and document how a user can lock
> > it down.
> > The purpose of the package is to provide USB remoting so I don't think
> > anyone would be surprised by the fact that the package allows raw access to
> > the device.
> > 
> > So two actions from my point of view
> > 
> > 1. Change default to yes
> 
> As said before this has security implications. If you can get permission for
> this from the security team I will happily change this, but until then it
> stays as it is.

Update: we've just gotten permission from the security team (Josh Bressers) to flip the default to yes, so we can go ahead with this.

Given that this is just a configuration change, it has a very low chance of causing regressions, so I think we should do this for 6.4, adding devel-ack and proposing as blocker.

Patch send to the list -> POST

Since the problem described in this bug report should be
resolved in a recent advisory, it has been closed with a
resolution of ERRATA.

For information on the advisory, and where to find the updated
files, follow the link below.

If the solution does not work for you, open a new bug report.

http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2013-0343.html