Bug 906032 (CVE-2013-0241)
Summary: | CVE-2013-0241 qxl: synchronous io guest DoS | ||
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Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | Petr Matousek <pmatouse> |
Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team> |
Status: | CLOSED ERRATA | QA Contact: | |
Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
Priority: | medium | ||
Version: | unspecified | CC: | airlied, cfergeau, hdegoede, kem, marcandre.lureau, xgl-maint |
Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
Target Release: | --- | ||
Hardware: | All | ||
OS: | Linux | ||
Whiteboard: | |||
Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
Last Closed: | 2021-10-19 22:00:07 UTC | Type: | --- |
Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
Embargoed: | |||
Bug Depends On: | 871027, 888364 | ||
Bug Blocks: | 906035, 906069 |
Description
Petr Matousek
2013-01-30 16:31:25 UTC
This issue has been addressed in following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Via RHSA-2013:0218 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-0218.html The fix isn't really a fix for all situations, since old drivers could be run in the guest and we don't prevent that from happening. On the other hand in second reading I don't think I agree with this being a CVE at all. Sure, the viewer app, which is remote, can cause the guest to be unresponsive, even to crash. But: 1. This is no different then running a faulty guest kernel, something a remote user can do already. 2. The viewer is part of the guest, i.e. it is treated as having permissions to do anything in the guest, if it should be verified then we use a password for that. This point overlaps point 1. 3. qemu doesn't crash in the process, the host isn't affected. Alon (In reply to comment #2) > The fix isn't really a fix for all situations, since old drivers could be > run in the guest and we don't prevent that from happening. Right, but we document that the fix relies on qemu-kvm functionality in comment #0. > On the other hand in second reading I don't think I agree with this being a > CVE at all. Sure, the viewer app, which is remote, can cause the guest to be > unresponsive, even to crash. But: > ... Can the user have access to spice console and not be a guest administrator? I see your point, it can be considered an elevation from a general spice console user to a guest administrator.(In reply to comment #3) > (In reply to comment #2) > > The fix isn't really a fix for all situations, since old drivers could be > > run in the guest and we don't prevent that from happening. > > Right, but we document that the fix relies on qemu-kvm functionality in > comment #0. > > > On the other hand in second reading I don't think I agree with this being a > > CVE at all. Sure, the viewer app, which is remote, can cause the guest to be > > unresponsive, even to crash. But: > > ... > > Can the user have access to spice console and not be a guest administrator? I see your point, it can be considered an elevation from a general spice console user to a guest administrator. Yes, what you describe is possible, I'm used to the situation where they are the same but probably it isn't common in an office deployment where there is a separate administrator. |