Red Hat Bugzilla – Full Text Bug Listing
|Summary:||CVE-2013-2145 perl-Module-Signature: arbitrary code execution when verifying SIGNATURE|
|Product:||[Other] Security Response||Reporter:||Vincent Danen <vdanen>|
|Component:||vulnerability||Assignee:||Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team>|
|Status:||NEW ---||QA Contact:|
|Version:||unspecified||CC:||paul, perl-devel, pertusus, ppisar, vdanen|
|Fixed In Version:||perl-Module-Signature 0.72||Doc Type:||Bug Fix|
|Doc Text:||Story Points:||---|
|:||971447 (view as bug list)||Environment:|
|oVirt Team:||---||RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:|
|Bug Depends On:||971098, 971099, 971447|
Description Vincent Danen 2013-06-05 12:32:42 EDT
The perl Module::Signature module adds signing capabilities to CPAN modules. The 'cpansign verify' command will automatically download keys and use them to check the signature of CPAN packages via the SIGNATURE file. The format of the SIGNATURE file includes the cipher to use to match the provided hash; for instance: SHA1 955ba924e9cd1bafccb4d6d7bd3be25c3ce8bf75 README If an attacker were to replace this (SHA1) with a special unknown cipher (e.g. 'Special') and were to include in the distribution a 'Digest/Special.pm', the code in this perl module would be executed when 'cpansign -verify' is run. This will execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running cpansign. Because cpansign will download public keys from a public key repository, the GPG key used to sign the SIGNATURE file may also be suspect; an attacker able to modify a CPAN module distribution file and sign the SIGNATURE file with their own key only has to make their key public. cpansign will download the attacker's key, validate the SIGNATURE file as being correctly signed, but will then execute code as noted above, if the SIGNATURE file is crafted in this way. Module::Signature version 0.72 corrects , this issue by refusing to load Digest::* modules from relative paths in @INC.  https://github.com/audreyt/module-signature/commit/575f7bd6ba4cc7c92f841e8758f88a131674ebf2  https://github.com/audreyt/module-signature/commit/cbd06b392a73c63159dc5c20ff5b3c8fc88c4896 Acknowledgements: This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of the Red Hat Product Security Team.
Comment 1 Vincent Danen 2013-06-05 12:39:36 EDT
Created perl-Module-Signature tracking bugs for this issue Affects: fedora-all [bug 971098] Affects: epel-all [bug 971099]
Comment 4 Fedora Update System 2013-06-16 02:13:40 EDT
perl-Module-Signature-0.73-1.fc19 has been pushed to the Fedora 19 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.
Comment 5 Fedora Update System 2013-06-17 21:32:47 EDT
perl-Module-Signature-0.73-1.fc18 has been pushed to the Fedora 18 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.
Comment 6 Fedora Update System 2013-06-17 21:35:41 EDT
perl-Module-Signature-0.73-1.fc17 has been pushed to the Fedora 17 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.
Comment 7 Fedora Update System 2013-06-23 17:33:44 EDT
perl-Module-Signature-0.73-1.el6 has been pushed to the Fedora EPEL 6 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.
Comment 8 Fedora Update System 2013-06-24 17:05:54 EDT
perl-Module-Signature-0.73-1.el5 has been pushed to the Fedora EPEL 5 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.
Comment 9 Paul Howarth 2015-02-05 04:21:03 EST
This is fixed in all current Fedora and EPEL releases. RHEL-7 has perl-Module-Signature-0.73-2.el7. I think this bug can be closed.