Bug 1020341 - OCSP responses with MD5withRSA signatures are accepted as secure
Summary: OCSP responses with MD5withRSA signatures are accepted as secure
Keywords:
Status: CLOSED CURRENTRELEASE
Alias: None
Product: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
Classification: Red Hat
Component: openssl
Version: 7.0
Hardware: Unspecified
OS: Unspecified
high
high
Target Milestone: rc
: ---
Assignee: Tomas Mraz
QA Contact: Hubert Kario
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On: 987550
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2013-10-17 13:23 UTC by Hubert Kario
Modified: 2014-06-18 03:52 UTC (History)
4 users (show)

Fixed In Version: openssl-1.0.1e-24.el7
Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Clone Of: 987550
Environment:
Last Closed: 2014-06-13 11:48:03 UTC
Target Upstream Version:

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Comment 4 Tomas Mraz 2013-11-13 09:44:07 UTC 
The question is whether we should diverge from upstream on this. Also should it be disabled also for CRL verification?
Comment 5 Hubert Kario 2013-11-13 11:56:26 UTC 
(In reply to Tomas Mraz from comment #4)
> The question is whether we should diverge from upstream on this. Also should
> it be disabled also for CRL verification?

Yes, all three uses for MD5withRSA are vulnerable. OCSP, certificates and CRLs, all of them allow for arbitrary extensions, which are placed as last in the hashed data, so all of them are vulnerable to chosen-prefix collision attacks. MD5 is completely broken for chosen-prefix collision attacks (complexity 2^39).
Comment 6 Tomas Mraz 2013-11-13 12:29:43 UTC 
Does NSS in RHEL-7 disable all these three uses?
Comment 7 Hubert Kario 2013-11-13 12:55:45 UTC 
(In reply to Tomas Mraz from comment #6)
> Does NSS in RHEL-7 disable all these three uses?

Yes, it doesn't trust them by default. See bug 1012656.
Comment 9 Ludek Smid 2014-06-13 11:48:03 UTC 
This request was resolved in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.0.

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