Bug 137247 - CAN-2004-0990 integer overflow in PNG handling.
CAN-2004-0990 integer overflow in PNG handling.
Product: Fedora
Classification: Fedora
Component: gd (Show other bugs)
All Linux
medium Severity medium
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Assigned To: Phil Knirsch
: Security
Depends On:
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Reported: 2004-10-26 18:29 EDT by Josh Bressers
Modified: 2015-03-04 20:14 EST (History)
2 users (show)

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Fixed In Version:
Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
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Clone Of:
Last Closed: 2004-11-11 06:00:55 EST
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RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description Josh Bressers 2004-10-26 18:29:22 EDT
This was reported to bugtraq.


There is an integer overflow when allocating memory in the routine
that handles
loading PNG image files.  This later leads to heap data structures being
overwritten.  If an attacker tricked a user into loading a malicious
PNG image,
they could leverage this into executing arbitrary code in the context
of the
user opening image.  Many programs use GD, such as ImageMagick, and more
importantly it is also the image library used for PHP, and there is a Perl
module as well.  One possibile target would be PHP driven photo
websites that
let users upload images.  Some of them will resize/compress the image
when the
user uploads them.  If this is done using GD, this could be used to
execute code
on the server.  There is a mitigating factor, in order to reach the
code, a large amount of memory needs to be allocated.  My 128MB p2
crapped out
one allocation before it reached the overflow.  However, I think on a
newer box
with lots of memory and swap space, that won't be a problem.



The vulnerable code occurs in the file gd_png.c, in the function
gdImageCreateFromPngCtx(), which is called by gdImageCreateFromPng().  The
function is used to load an image file into GD data structures.  The
occurs when allocating memory for the image rows, line 314 or so ( I
added some
comments so line number might be off).  Two user supplied values are
together (rowbytes * height), and used to allocate memory for an array of
pointers.  This pointer array is then passed to the png_read_image()
which belongs to the libPNG library.  In that function, the pointers
are passed
to the png_read_row() function.  The data for the rows is decompressed
zLib function inflate(), and then passed to the png_combine_row()
where the deflated data is memcpy()'d into the heap buffer. 
Exploitation would
require using zLib functions to compress the payload.  Successful
would lead to executing arbitrary code.
Comment 1 Josh Bressers 2004-10-26 18:30:45 EDT
This issue is also going to have to be fixed in FC3.

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