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Description of problem:
In /src/gp_creds.c, in gp_add_krb5_creds, the local varable cred_store
is never initialized. A pointer to it is first passed into
gp_get_cred_environment. In that function:
329 /* allocate 1 more than in source, just in case we need to add
330 * an internal client_keytab element */
331 cs->elements = calloc(svc->krb5.cred_count + 1,
332 sizeof(gss_key_value_element_desc));
333 if (!cs->elements) {
334 ret = ENOMEM;
335 goto done;
336 }
and the "done" label goes like:
410 done:
411 if (ret) {
412 free_cred_store_elements(cs);
413 }
414 return ret;
415 }
and free_cred_store_elements looks like:
206 static void free_cred_store_elements(gss_key_value_set_desc *cs)
207 {
208 int i;
209
210 for (i = 0; i < cs->count; i++) {
211 safefree(cs->elements[i].key);
212 safefree(cs->elements[i].value);
213 }
214 safefree(cs->elements);
215 }
Following this code path, cs->count is never initialized, and whatever
random crud that happens to be on the stack will be taken as a counter,
and whatever random crud happens to on the stack be where
cs->elements[i] is located will be interpreted as a pointer to a key.
Likewise with cs->elements[i].value.
It would be wise to simply initialize the variable cred_store in
gp_get_cred_environment to {0, NULL}.
Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
How reproducible:
100%.
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Look at the code.
2. See the bug.
3. Slap self in forehead.
Actual results:
Seg-fault from dereferencing a random number as a pointer.
Expected results:
No seg-fault.
Additional info:
Description of problem: In /src/gp_creds.c, in gp_add_krb5_creds, the local varable cred_store is never initialized. A pointer to it is first passed into gp_get_cred_environment. In that function: 329 /* allocate 1 more than in source, just in case we need to add 330 * an internal client_keytab element */ 331 cs->elements = calloc(svc->krb5.cred_count + 1, 332 sizeof(gss_key_value_element_desc)); 333 if (!cs->elements) { 334 ret = ENOMEM; 335 goto done; 336 } and the "done" label goes like: 410 done: 411 if (ret) { 412 free_cred_store_elements(cs); 413 } 414 return ret; 415 } and free_cred_store_elements looks like: 206 static void free_cred_store_elements(gss_key_value_set_desc *cs) 207 { 208 int i; 209 210 for (i = 0; i < cs->count; i++) { 211 safefree(cs->elements[i].key); 212 safefree(cs->elements[i].value); 213 } 214 safefree(cs->elements); 215 } Following this code path, cs->count is never initialized, and whatever random crud that happens to be on the stack will be taken as a counter, and whatever random crud happens to on the stack be where cs->elements[i] is located will be interpreted as a pointer to a key. Likewise with cs->elements[i].value. It would be wise to simply initialize the variable cred_store in gp_get_cred_environment to {0, NULL}. Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): How reproducible: 100%. Steps to Reproduce: 1. Look at the code. 2. See the bug. 3. Slap self in forehead. Actual results: Seg-fault from dereferencing a random number as a pointer. Expected results: No seg-fault. Additional info: