The following weak client-to-server encryption algorithms are supported by the remote service:
i fixed that *years* ago but now switched from my sshd.service to socket-activation and "ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY" is nice BUT you have no business to override explicit settings by admins knowing what they are doing longer than crypto policy exists at all
this is nonsense - explicit set options in ssd_config has to be optout enough
# Configuration file for the sshd service.
# The server keys are automatically generated if they are missing.
# To change the automatic creation, adjust sshd.service options for
# example using systemctl enable firstname.lastname@example.org to allow creation
# of DSA key or systemctl mask email@example.com to disable RSA key
# System-wide crypto policy:
# To opt-out, uncomment the following line
First of all, the claim that aes256-cbc is week is at least arguable. It is indeed not recommended cipher but it can be useful as a fallback to talk with older clients.
The sysconfig file should be loaded also for the socket activated service so you should be able to opt out the same way for your new socket activated service.
Unfortunately, there is no better for sshd to load some policy file at this moment or to honor the crypto algorithms written in the configuration file, but if you have a better idea how to solve this problem, I would be glad to hear it.
If you believe the cbc ciphers should not be in the default policy, feel free to open an issue on upstream:
sshd should simply weight explicit config values over global policies
If it would be that simple to achieve, it would be done. But unfortunately it is not possible without extensively patching sshd, preprocessing configuration file, modifying its location or something even worse affecting much more users.
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