SELinux is preventing /usr/lib64/nspluginwrapper/npconfig from 'add_name' accesses on the directory nswrapper_64_64.liblightsparkplugin.so. ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that npconfig should be allowed add_name access on the nswrapper_64_64.liblightsparkplugin.so directory by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep npconfig /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context unconfined_u:unconfined_r:sandbox_web_client_t:s0: c197,c496 Target Context system_u:object_r:nsplugin_rw_t:s0 Target Objects nswrapper_64_64.liblightsparkplugin.so [ dir ] Source npconfig Source Path /usr/lib64/nspluginwrapper/npconfig Port <Unknown> Host (removed) Source RPM Packages nspluginwrapper-1.3.0-15.fc14 Target RPM Packages Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.9.7-37.fc14 Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Permissive Host Name (removed) Platform Linux (removed) 2.6.38.2-10.fc15.x86_64 #1 SMP Thu Mar 31 03:11:25 UTC 2011 x86_64 x86_64 Alert Count 1 First Seen Tue 12 Apr 2011 02:27:39 PM IST Last Seen Tue 12 Apr 2011 02:27:39 PM IST Local ID 296d2c51-74ee-4078-abeb-811b180b6894 Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1302598659.589:27072): avc: denied { add_name } for pid=10296 comm="npconfig" name="nswrapper_64_64.liblightsparkplugin.so" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:sandbox_web_client_t:s0:c197,c496 tcontext=system_u:object_r:nsplugin_rw_t:s0 tclass=dir type=AVC msg=audit(1302598659.589:27072): avc: denied { create } for pid=10296 comm="npconfig" name="nswrapper_64_64.liblightsparkplugin.so" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:sandbox_web_client_t:s0:c197,c496 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:nsplugin_rw_t:s0:c197,c496 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1302598659.589:27072): avc: denied { write } for pid=10296 comm="npconfig" name="nswrapper_64_64.liblightsparkplugin.so" dev=dm-3 ino=4325893 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:sandbox_web_client_t:s0:c197,c496 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:nsplugin_rw_t:s0:c197,c496 tclass=file type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1302598659.589:27072): arch=x86_64 syscall=open success=yes exit=ESRCH a0=7fff95c12e40 a1=41 a2=1ed a3=0 items=0 ppid=10283 pid=10296 auid=500 uid=500 gid=501 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=501 sgid=501 fsgid=501 tty=(none) ses=1 comm=npconfig exe=/usr/lib64/nspluginwrapper/npconfig subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:sandbox_web_client_t:s0:c197,c496 key=(null) Hash: npconfig,sandbox_web_client_t,nsplugin_rw_t,dir,add_name audit2allow #============= sandbox_web_client_t ============== allow sandbox_web_client_t nsplugin_rw_t:dir add_name; allow sandbox_web_client_t nsplugin_rw_t:file { write create }; audit2allow -R #============= sandbox_web_client_t ============== allow sandbox_web_client_t nsplugin_rw_t:dir add_name; allow sandbox_web_client_t nsplugin_rw_t:file { write create };
AFAIK we had nsplugin_manage_rw(sandbox_web_type) in F13 policy.
I guess that is ok. My concern is this is a way for sandboxes to attack each other, but I think this is controlled. And we want sandbox_web to work.
Fixed in selinux-policy-3.9.7-40.fc14
selinux-policy-3.9.7-40.fc14 has been submitted as an update for Fedora 14. https://admin.fedoraproject.org/updates/selinux-policy-3.9.7-40.fc14
Package selinux-policy-3.9.7-40.fc14: * should fix your issue, * was pushed to the Fedora 14 testing repository, * should be available at your local mirror within two days. Update it with: # su -c 'yum update --enablerepo=updates-testing selinux-policy-3.9.7-40.fc14' as soon as you are able to. Please go to the following url: https://admin.fedoraproject.org/updates/selinux-policy-3.9.7-40.fc14 then log in and leave karma (feedback).
selinux-policy-3.9.7-40.fc14 has been pushed to the Fedora 14 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.