Having privileged process using /tmp is dangerous Unpriv users could get priv escalation.
Could you give me an example where Deltacloud is trying to store something in /tmp? AFAIK the only driver we have that actually 'store' something is Mock driver and it should use /var/tmp instead of /tmp. Also in /var/tmp the files created by the Mock driver should have user set to user who run Deltacloud.
I see files in /var/tmp and I don't beleive I ever ran any deltacloud apps as non root, I also see the ownership on these files as owned by nobody. UID=99?
Yes, that files was copied there by deltacloud-core RPM as the default 'mock' driver fixtures. Since Deltacloud API should be run as user 'nobody' by default the files also need to be owned by user 'nobody' in order to work with them.
The user account nobody is sort of a shared account. Meaning people used it for dropping privs rather than doing the right thing and asking for a real account. If this needs to be secure, I would ask for an assigned UID and not use nobody. I don't know what it would be doing in any kind of temp dir. But they are normally required to be mounted noexec,nosuid,nodev for compliance reasons. If that is a problem, I'd get something under /var/run/ or another /var directory
The point being that deltacloud is not a user, it is a service. services should use /var/run for temporary storage and /var/lib for permanant storage. /tmp and /var/tmp is for real users. The only time a system service should use these directories is if they have to interact with real users, otherwise you are just opening your system service to potential security risk, when there is no reason for it.
(In reply to comment #5) > The point being that deltacloud is not a user, it is a service. services > should use /var/run for temporary storage and /var/lib for permanant storage. > > /tmp and /var/tmp is for real users. The only time a system service should use > these directories is if they have to interact with real users, otherwise you > are just opening your system service to potential security risk, when there is > no reason for it. Huh, thanks for this informations Daniel. I'll update deltacloud mock driver to use /var/lib instead of /var/tmp. This mock fixtures are kind of persistence layer for mock yaml files used in our 'fake' cloud provider.
Ok also make sure the /var/lib/DIRNAME is in the pay load. And then we can setup proper labelling for this directory.
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