Raphael Geissert conducted a review of various packages in Debian and found that TeXmacs contained two scripts that could be abused by an attacker to execute arbitrary code [1].

The vulnerability is due to an insecure change to LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and environment variable used by ld.so(8) to look for libraries in directories other than the standard paths.  When there is an empty item in the colon-separated list of directories in LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ld.so(8) treats it as a '.' (current working directory).  If the given script is executed from a directory where a local attacker could write files, there is a chance for exploitation.

In Fedora, /usr/bin/TeXmacs re-sets LD_LIBRARY_PATH insecurely:

LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$TEXMACS_BIN_PATH/lib${LD_LIBRARY_PATH+":$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"}"
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH

and so does /usr/libexec/TeXmacs/bin/tm_mupad_help:

LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH:${MuPAD_ROOT_PATH}/${SYSINFO}/lib:/usr/local/X11R6/motif-2.0/lib:/usr/local/X11R6/lib:$MuPAD_ROOT_PATH/$SYSINFO/bin
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH

A solution is to patch the scripts to test if $LD_LIBRARY_PATH is set first before attempting to modify it:

if [ -z ${LD_LIBRARY_PATH} ]; then
    export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/lib/foo
else
    export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/lib/foo:${LD_LIBRARY_PATH}
fi

This issue has been assigned the name CVE-2010-3394.

[1] http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=598424