A vulnerability in P2P functionality in wpa_supplicant has been discovered. A vulnerability was found in how wpa_supplicant uses SSID information parsed from management frames that create or update P2P peer entries (e.g., Probe Response frame or number of P2P Public Action frames). SSID field has valid length range of 0-32 octets. However, it is transmitted in an element that has a 8-bit length field and potential maximum payload length of 255 octets. wpa_supplicant was not sufficiently verifying the payload length on one of the code paths using the SSID received from a peer device. This can result in copying arbitrary data from an attacker to a fixed length buffer of 32 bytes (i.e., a possible overflow of up to 223 bytes). The SSID buffer is within struct p2p_device that is allocated from heap. The overflow can override couple of variables in the struct, including a pointer that gets freed. In addition about 150 bytes (the exact length depending on architecture) can be written beyond the end of the heap allocation. This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service due to wpa_supplicant process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation, and potentially arbitrary code execution. Vulnerable versions/configurations wpa_supplicant v1.0-v2.4 with CONFIG_P2P build option enabled Attacker (or a system controlled by the attacker) needs to be within radio range of the vulnerable system to send a suitably constructed management frame that triggers a P2P peer device information to be created or updated. The vulnerability is easiest to exploit while the device has started an active P2P operation (e.g., has ongoing P2P_FIND or P2P_LISTEN control interface command in progress). However, it may be possible, though significantly more difficult, to trigger this even without any active P2P operation in progress. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant and rebuild it: P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it This patch is available from http://w1.fi/security/2015-1/ - Update to wpa_supplicant v2.5 or newer, once available - Disable P2P (control interface command "P2P_SET disabled 1" or "p2p_disabled=1" in (each, if multiple interfaces used) wpa_supplicant configuration file) External References: http://w1.fi/security/2015-1/ Acknowledgements: Red Hat would like to thank Jouni Malinen of the wpa_supplicant upstream for reporting this issue. Upstream acknowledges Alibaba security team as the original reporter.
Created attachment 1014657 [details] 0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch Suggested patch
Public now via upstream advisory: http://w1.fi/security/2015-1/wpa_supplicant-p2p-ssid-overflow.txt Upstream commit: http://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd
Created wpa_supplicant tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: fedora-all [bug 1215134]
Alibaba security team advisory: http://security.alibaba.com/blog/blog.htm?id=19 http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Apr/82
This issue only affected wpa_supplicant versions 1.0 and later. The wpa_supplicant packages in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 and earlier are based on older upstream versions (0.x), which do not include vulnerable code and hence are not affected. The wpa_supplicant is commonly used with NetworkManager. The NetworkManager in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 does not configure wpa_supplicant to search for or create P2P / WLAN Direct networks. Upstream advisory notes that such configurations that do not perform any active P2P operations are also affected, but the issue is harder to trigger. Raising priority, as wpa_supplicant is typically run as root. Statement: This issue did not affect the wpa_supplicant versions as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 and 6.
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Via RHSA-2015:1090 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015-1090.html