Prior to any download in the SCP sink protocol, the server sends a line of text consisting of an octal number encoding Unix file permissions, a decimal number encoding the file size, and the file name. Since the file size can exceed 232 bytes, and in some compilation configurations of PuTTY the host platform's largest integer type is only 32 bits wide, PuTTY extracts the decimal file size into a temporary string variable to send to its own 64-bit decimal decoding function. Unfortunately, that extraction was done carelessly, using a sscanf with no length limit, permitting a buffer overrun. External references: http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/wishlist/vuln-pscp-sink-sscanf.html http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Mar/22 Upstream fix: http://tartarus.org/~simon-git/gitweb/?p=putty.git;a=commit;h=bc6c15ab5f636e05b7e91883f0031a7e06117947
Created putty tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: fedora-all [bug 1316482] Affects: epel-6 [bug 1316485] Affects: epel-5 [bug 1316486]
putty-0.63-6.el5 has been pushed to the Fedora EPEL 5 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.
putty-0.63-6.el6 has been pushed to the Fedora EPEL 6 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.
This CVE Bugzilla entry is for community support informational purposes only as it does not affect a package in a commercially supported Red Hat product. Refer to the dependent bugs for status of those individual community products.