Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) handshake traffic can be manipulated to induce nonce and session key reuse, resulting in key reinstallation by a victim wireless access point (AP) or client. After establishing a man-in-the-middle position between an AP and client, an attacker can selectively manipulate the timing and transmission of messages in the WPA2 PeerKey handshake, resulting in out-of-sequence reception or retransmission of messages.
An attacker within the wireless communications range of an affected AP and client may leverage these vulnerabilities to conduct attacks that are dependent on the data confidentiality protocol being used. Attacks may include arbitrary packet decryption and injection, TCP connection hijacking, HTTP content injection, or the replay of unicast, broadcast, and multicast frames.
Upstream: Mathy Vanhoef (University of Leuven)
This issue did not affect the versions of wpa_supplicant as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 6, and 7, as wpa_supplicant's implementation of the PeerKey handshake mechanism is incomplete and does not allow the installation of a key into the driver.