An architectural flaw with how credentials are handled can be exploited to allow an unprivileged user to impersonate the SlurmUser account. Access to the SlurmUser account can be used to execute arbitrary processes as root. This issue impacts all Slurm releases since at least Slurm 1.0.0. Systems remain vulnerable until all slurmdbd, slurmctld, and slurmd processes have been restarted in the cluster. Once all daemons have been upgraded sites are encouraged to add "block_null_hash" to CommunicationParameters. That new option provides additional protection against a potential exploit. https://lists.schedmd.com/pipermail/slurm-announce/2022/000072.html
Created slurm tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: epel-all [bug 2082285] Affects: fedora-all [bug 2082286]
This CVE Bugzilla entry is for community support informational purposes only as it does not affect a package in a commercially supported Red Hat product. Refer to the dependent bugs for status of those individual community products.