Bug 2127092 (CVE-2022-36113, CVE-2022-36114) - CVE-2022-36113 CVE-2022-36114 rust-cargo: multiple vulnerabilities
Summary: CVE-2022-36113 CVE-2022-36114 rust-cargo: multiple vulnerabilities
Keywords:
Status: CLOSED UPSTREAM
Alias: CVE-2022-36113, CVE-2022-36114
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
low
low
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Red Hat Product Security
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On: 2127093
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2022-09-15 10:24 UTC by ybuenos
Modified: 2022-11-27 10:30 UTC (History)
3 users (show)

Fixed In Version: rust-cargo 0.65
Doc Type: If docs needed, set a value
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Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed: 2022-11-27 10:30:23 UTC


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Description ybuenos 2022-09-15 10:24:07 UTC
Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. After a package is downloaded, Cargo extracts its source code in the ~/.cargo folder on disk, making it available to the Rust projects it builds. To record when an extraction is successful, Cargo writes "ok" to the .cargo-ok file at the root of the extracted source code once it extracted all the files. It was discovered that Cargo allowed packages to contain a .cargo-ok symbolic link, which Cargo would extract. Then, when Cargo attempted to write "ok" into .cargo-ok, it would actually replace the first two bytes of the file the symlink pointed to with ok. This would allow an attacker to corrupt one file on the machine using Cargo to extract the package. Note that by design Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as it's possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is present in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since the vulnerability is just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are available for Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their own toolchain. Mitigations We recommend users of alternate registries to exercise care in which package they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to exercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as remote code execution is allowed by design there as well.

https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/commit/97b80919e404b0768ea31ae329c3b4da54bed05a
https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/security/advisories/GHSA-rfj2-q3h3-hm5j

Comment 1 ybuenos 2022-09-15 10:24:20 UTC
Created rust-cargo tracking bugs for this issue:

Affects: fedora-all [bug 2127093]

Comment 2 Josh Stone 2022-09-15 15:13:53 UTC
Note that the "rust-cargo" package in Fedora is only the library version of this code. The Cargo CLI is independent as part of the main "rust" package, which should also be fixed -- and we'll get that when Rust 1.64.0 releases next week.

Comment 4 Product Security DevOps Team 2022-11-27 10:30:21 UTC
This CVE Bugzilla entry is for community support informational purposes only as it does not affect a package in a commercially supported Red Hat product. Refer to the dependent bugs for status of those individual community products.


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