In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: br_netfilter: do not check confirmed bit in br_nf_local_in() after confirm

When send a broadcast packet to a tap device, which was added to a bridge,
br_nf_local_in() is called to confirm the conntrack. If another conntrack
with the same hash value is added to the hash table, which can be
triggered by a normal packet to a non-bridge device, the below warning
may happen.

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 96 at net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:632 br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 96 Comm: tap_send Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-dirty #44 PREEMPT(voluntary)
  RIP: 0010:br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   nf_hook_slow+0x3e/0xf0
   br_pass_frame_up+0x103/0x180
   br_handle_frame_finish+0x2de/0x5b0
   br_nf_hook_thresh+0xc0/0x120
   br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x168/0x3a0
   br_nf_pre_routing+0x237/0x5e0
   br_handle_frame+0x1ec/0x3c0
   __netif_receive_skb_core+0x225/0x1210
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x37/0xa0
   netif_receive_skb+0x36/0x160
   tun_get_user+0xa54/0x10c0
   tun_chr_write_iter+0x65/0xb0
   vfs_write+0x305/0x410
   ksys_write+0x60/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   </TASK>
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

To solve the hash conflict, nf_ct_resolve_clash() try to merge the
conntracks, and update skb->_nfct. However, br_nf_local_in() still use the
old ct from local variable 'nfct' after confirm(), which leads to this
warning.

If confirm() does not insert the conntrack entry and return NF_DROP, the
warning may also occur. There is no need to reserve the WARN_ON_ONCE, just
remove it.