In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation VMSCAPE is a vulnerability that exploits insufficient branch predictor isolation between a guest and a userspace hypervisor (like QEMU). Existing mitigations already protect kernel/KVM from a malicious guest. Userspace can additionally be protected by flushing the branch predictors after a VMexit. Since it is the userspace that consumes the poisoned branch predictors, conditionally issue an IBPB after a VMexit and before returning to userspace. Workloads that frequently switch between hypervisor and userspace will incur the most overhead from the new IBPB. This new IBPB is not integrated with the existing IBPB sites. For instance, a task can use the existing speculation control prctl() to get an IBPB at context switch time. With this implementation, the IBPB is doubled up: one at context switch and another before running userspace. The intent is to integrate and optimize these cases post-embargo. [ dhansen: elaborate on suboptimal IBPB solution ]
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Via RHSA-2025:19932 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:19932
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 Via RHSA-2025:19930 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:19930
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Via RHSA-2025:19931 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:19931
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 Via RHSA-2025:21112 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:21112
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 Via RHSA-2025:21118 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:21118
Upstream advisory: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2025091128-CVE-2025-40300-5569@gregkh/