Per the vulnerability report, "To perform this exploit, an attacker must find a way to create or modify the “awstats.confˮ file with malicious content" (specifically, modifying DNSLastUpdateCacheFile to contain a malicious value and potentially changing the values of other, enabling, options)

Unless I'm misunderstanding the vulnerability report, this is only really an issue if a user has write-access to awstats.conf, and that configuration file is subsequently used by a *different* user (for example, "root", or "apache") running awstats, thereby enabling code execution by that (second) user. Or if a user has the ability to modify an awstats.conf file (through a web interface, for example) but normally no ability to execute code on the target system as the user owning that file.

This does not seem to be the default configuration in Fedora/EPEL; whilst AWStats may be executed as "root" or "apache", only the following folders (per /usr/local/awstats/wwwroot/cgi-bin/awstats.pl) are searched for awstats.conf, none of which are by default writeable by an untrusted user:

/usr/local/awstats/wwwroot/cgi-bin
/etc/awstats
/usr/local/etc/awstats
/etc/opt/awstats

Additionally, /etc/cron.hourly/awstats explicitly uses /etc/awstats as the configuration directory

So, whilst it would be beneficial for AWStats to prevent this abuse of a configuration file option, I can't immediately see a means to exploit it in the default Fedora/EPEL configuration.