Bug 2546288 (CVE-2026-105929) - CVE-2026-105929 ansible-core: ansible-galaxy role install path traversal via unvalidated role name allows file writes and directory deletion outside the roles directory
Summary: CVE-2026-105929 ansible-core: ansible-galaxy role install path traversal via ...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-105929
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
high
high
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-10-06 06:40 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-11-17 14:26 UTC (History)
83 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-06 06:40:17 UTC
Impacted project: ansible/ansible (ansible-core).

RoleRequirement.role_yaml_parse() preserves an explicit role "name" without validation. GalaxyRole.__init__() then constructs installation paths using os.path.join(roles_path, name): self.paths = [os.path.join(x, self.name) for x in galaxy.roles_paths]. A name containing "../" escapes the configured roles directory; an absolute name replaces it entirely (os.path.join discards earlier components on an absolute argument). Installation does not validate that the final destination remains under the selected roles path.

Data flow:
1. lib/ansible/playbook/role/requirement.py - role_yaml_parse() keeps the attacker-supplied name.
2. lib/ansible/cli/galaxy.py - dep_info = dep_req.role_yaml_parse(dep); dep_role = GalaxyRole(self.galaxy, self.lazy_role_api, **dep_info).
3. lib/ansible/galaxy/role.py - self.name = name; self.src = src or name; self.paths = [os.path.join(x, self.name) for x in galaxy.roles_paths].

The CLI processes dependencies from an installed role's meta/requirements.yml, so a role publisher supplies the malicious name without the operator explicitly choosing that destination. The existing archive-member (tar) path check does not prevent this: it constrains members relative to the extraction root, while the extraction root itself is attacker-influenced via the name. This is therefore distinct from the tar-member traversal addressed by CVE-2020-10691.

With --force, install() calls GalaxyRole.remove(), which runs shutil.rmtree(self.path). remove() is gated on self.metadata being truthy, i.e. the target already contains a valid role (meta/main.yml); so the deletion/replacement capability applies to role-shaped directories outside the selected roles path rather than to arbitrary directories. File creation outside the roles path is unconditional.

Affected code confirmed present by source inspection in stable-2.19 (lib/ansible/galaxy/role.py). Reporter observed the behavior on ansible-core 2.21.4 and on upstream devel. The pattern is long-standing; streams 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20 are expected affected (2.19 confirmed; verify 2.18/2.20).

Upstream: https://github.com/ansible/ansible
Affected files: lib/ansible/galaxy/role.py, lib/ansible/playbook/role/requirement.py, lib/ansible/cli/galaxy.py


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