Bug 2578653 (CVE-2026-133879) - CVE-2026-133879 kubevirt: containerized-data-importer: kubevirt/CDI: cross-namespace PVC clone authorization bypass via user-controlled checkStaticVolume DataVolume annotation
Summary: CVE-2026-133879 kubevirt: containerized-data-importer: kubevirt/CDI: cross-na...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-133879
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
high
high
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-11-20 15:46 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-11-20 16:16 UTC (History)
3 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-20 15:46:08 UTC
A flaw was found in kubevirt/containerized-data-importer. A tenant who can create or update a VirtualMachine in their own namespace can set the cdi.kubevirt.io/storage.checkStaticVolume annotation on an embedded DataVolumeTemplate together with a cross-namespace clone source. The VM admission check (validateVirtualMachineDataVolumeTemplateNamespace) only validates the DataVolume's own namespace and does not restrict annotations or spec.source.pvc.namespace, so the request passes. The annotation is propagated onto the generated DataVolume, where AuthorizeSA treats it as noTokenOkay and converts a failed service-account clone-authorization SubjectAccessReview into an allowed result (ErrNoTokenOkay), which virt-controller accepts. virt-controller then creates the clone DataVolume on the tenant's behalf, and CDI - which proceeds with normal population when no statically provisioned PV is found - can clone the victim namespace's PVC into the attacker's namespace, resulting in cross-tenant data disclosure.


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