Bug 2498058 (CVE-2026-15063) - CVE-2026-15063 trustyai-service-operator: TrustyAI Service Operator: Gorch port bypass when auth IS enabled
Summary: CVE-2026-15063 trustyai-service-operator: TrustyAI Service Operator: Gorch po...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-15063
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-07-08 14:34 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-07-08 14:44 UTC (History)
0 users

Fixed In Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-08 14:34:19 UTC
The gorch service template (gorch/templates/service.tmpl.yaml:27-32) publishes https-tls: 8032->8032 (unproxied orchestrator) and built-in-detector-metrics: 8080->8080 alongside the proxied ports, even when auth is enabled. The root cause is gorch/auth.go:30 which configures kube-rbac-proxy upstream as %s-service.%s.svc:8032 (Service DNS), architecturally requiring port 8032 to remain on the Service. Any pod on the cluster network can bypass kube-rbac-proxy by hitting port 8032 directly.

By contrast, NemoGuardrails properly switches to proxied-only ports when auth is enabled. EvalHub always deploys with kube-rbac-proxy and API_HOST=127.0.0.1 loopback binding, proving auth-by-default is architecturally achievable.

No NetworkPolicy exists anywhere in the codebase (grep returns zero results).

Gorch port bypass (even with auth enabled):
1. Enable auth on gorch via annotation
2. kube-rbac-proxy is deployed on port 8443
3. Port 8032 (orchestrator) and 8080 (detector metrics) remain exposed on the Service
4. Any pod hits port 8032 directly, bypassing kube-rbac-proxy


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