In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/net: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs()

sqe->len is __u32 but gets stored into sr->len which is int. When
userspace passes sqe->len values exceeding INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF),
sr->len overflows to a negative value. This negative value propagates
through the bundle recv/send path:

  1. io_recv(): sel.val = sr->len (ssize_t gets -1)
  2. io_recv_buf_select(): arg.max_len = sel->val (size_t gets
     0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF)
  3. io_ring_buffers_peek(): buf->len is not clamped because max_len
     is astronomically large
  4. iov[].iov_len = 0xFFFFFFFF flows into io_bundle_nbufs()
  5. io_bundle_nbufs(): min_t(int, 0xFFFFFFFF, ret) yields -1,
     causing ret to increase instead of decrease, creating an
     infinite loop that reads past the allocated iov[] array

This results in a slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs() from
the kmalloc-64 slab, as nbufs increments past the allocated iovec
entries.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ae05c8 by task exp/145
  Call Trace:
   io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160
   io_recv_finish+0x117/0xe20
   io_recv+0x2db/0x1160

Fix this by rejecting negative sr->len values early in both
io_sendmsg_prep() and io_recvmsg_prep(). Since sqe->len is __u32,
any value > INT_MAX indicates overflow and is not a valid length.