Bug 2450565 (CVE-2026-33306) - CVE-2026-33306 github.com/bcrypt-ruby/bcrypt-ruby: bcrypt-ruby (JRuby): Weakened password hashing due to integer overflow
Summary: CVE-2026-33306 github.com/bcrypt-ruby/bcrypt-ruby: bcrypt-ruby (JRuby): Weake...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-33306
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-03-24 01:01 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-03-24 11:17 UTC (History)
11 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed:
Embargoed:


Attachments (Terms of Use)

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-03-24 01:01:50 UTC
bcrypt-ruby is a Ruby binding for the OpenBSD bcrypt() password hashing algorithm. Prior to version 3.1.22, an integer overflow in the Java BCrypt implementation for JRuby can cause zero iterations in the strengthening loop.  Impacted applications must be setting the cost to 31 to see this happen. The JRuby implementation of bcrypt-ruby (`BCrypt.java`) computes the key-strengthening round count as a signed 32-bit integer. When `cost=31` (the maximum allowed by the gem), signed integer overflow causes the round count to become negative, and the strengthening loop executes **zero iterations**. This collapses bcrypt from 2^31 rounds of exponential key-strengthening to effectively constant-time computation — only the initial EksBlowfish key setup and final 64x encryption phase remain. The resulting hash looks valid (`$2a$31$...`) and verifies correctly via `checkpw`, making the weakness invisible to the application. This issue is triggered only when cost=31 is used or when verifying a `$2a$31$` hash. This problem has been fixed in version 3.1.22. As a workaround, set the cost to something less than 31.


Note You need to log in before you can comment on or make changes to this bug.