Bug 2477935 (CVE-2026-44310) - CVE-2026-44310 github.com/sigstore/gitsign: Gitsign: Security bypass in commit verification
Summary: CVE-2026-44310 github.com/sigstore/gitsign: Gitsign: Security bypass in commi...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-44310
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-05-15 17:01 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-06-16 11:56 UTC (History)
4 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-05-15 17:01:29 UTC
Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. From 0.4.0 to before 0.15.0, CertVerifier.Verify() in pkg/git/verifier.go unconditionally dereferences certs[0] after sd.GetCertificates() without checking the slice length. A CMS/PKCS7 signed message with an empty certificate set is a structurally valid DER payload; GetCertificates() returns an empty slice with no error, causing an immediate index-out-of-range panic. On the gitsign --verify code path (the GPG-compatible mode invoked by git verify-commit), the panic is silently recovered by internal/io/streams.go's Wrap() function, which returns nil instead of an error. main.go then exits with code 0, causing exit-code-only verification callers to interpret the failed verification as success. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.15.0.


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