In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register

For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with
len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail,
RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one
register via "*dest = 0". The remaining three registers are left as
whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()'s struct nft_regs, and a
downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that
uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.

The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only
meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type
while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest
of the declared span stale.

Fix both:

 - replace the bare "*dest = 0" in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(),
   which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already
   used on the other early-return path), and

 - restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its
   destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte
   the eval writes.